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ABSTRACT
The objective of this paper is to discuss research trends
in the context of power system emergency control. First,
different possible strategies are discussed for the design
of emergency control schemes. Then some new research
directions are presented. The paper does not restrict its
scope to a particular type of stability problem. Rather, it
aims at providing a global view of emergency control and
discusses the potential impact of new approaches.
1 INTRODUCTION
Power system security is more and more in conflict with
economic and environmental requirements. Security con-
trol aims at making decisions in different time horizons
so as to prevent the system to experience undesired situ-
ations, and in particular to avoid large catastrophic out-
ages. Traditionally, security control has been divided in
two main categories : preventive and emergency control
(EC).
In preventive security control, the objective is to pre-
pare the system when it is still in normal operation, so
as to make it capable of facing future (uncertain) events
in a satisfactory way. In emergency control, the disturb-
ing events have already occurred, and thus the objective
becomes to control the dynamics of the system in such a
way that consequences are minimized.
Thus, the main differences between preventive and
emergency control are as follows.
 Types of preventive control actions : generation
rescheduling; network switching; reactive compensa-
tion; sometimes, load curtailment.
 Types of emergency control actions : direct or indirect
load shedding; generation shedding; shunt capacitor or
reactor switching; network splitting.
 Frequency of control actions : very frequent in preven-
tive control and rather infrequent in emergency control.
 Instantaneous cost of individual control actions : rather
low in preventive control; very high in emergency con-
trol.
 Total (integrated) cost of control actions : potentially
very high in preventive control, low in emergency con-
trol (as far as emergencies remain very rare events).
 Time available for decision making : quite long in pre-
ventive control; may be very short in emergency con-
trol.
 Complexity of possible control operations : may be
high in preventive control; must be simple in emer-
gency control to be applicable in real-time.
 Uncertainty : in preventive control, the state of the sys-
tem is well known but disturbances are uncertain; in
emergency control, the disturbance is certain, but the
state of the system is often only partially known; in
both cases, dynamic behavior is uncertain.
 Open versus closed loop : preventive control is gen-
erally of the open loop feed-forward type; emergency
control may be closed loop, and hence more robust
w.r.t. uncertainties.
 Coordination among different control objectives : is
possible in principle in preventive control; is much
more difficult in emergency control.
 Strategy : preventive control is generally designed to
handle the most likely events; emergency control is
specially useful if it can handle also very unlikely
events/situations.
In the past, many utilities have relied on preventive
control in order to maintain system security at an accept-
able level. In other words, while there are many emer-
gency control schemes installed in reality, the objective
in the past has been to prevent these schemes as much
as possible from operating, by imposing rather high ob-
jectives to preventive security control. As to any rule,
there are exceptions : for example controlled generation
shedding has been used extensively in North America to
handle transient stability problems; in the same way, cor-
rective control has been used in many systems as an al-
ternative to preventive control in the context of thermal
overload mitigation. We will come back to these aspects
in the main part of the paper.
Today, it seems that the pressure is to increase trading
and competition in the power system field. This means
that preventive security control will be (if it is not already)
looked at as being an impediment to competition. Hence,
in the future there will be strong incentives to rely less
on preventive control and more often on emergency con-
trol. The objective of this paper is therefore to analyse
the role of emergency control from a global perspective
and to discuss new approaches and techniques which may
help to improve power system emergency control plans.
Rather than trying to provide a survey of existing work
(which may be found e.g. in [13]) we try to provide a
critical overview of the problem and of the solutions pro-
posed by different research schools.
The paper is organized in the following way. In section
2, we start by discussing in a general setting what are the
main issues to be addressed in the context of emergency
control, starting with broad strategic decisions and end-
ing with implementation concerns. Section 3 briefly re-
views existing emergency control schemes and Section
4 discusses the main technological changes which are
presently observed or will be in the near future, both in
the context of hardware and software. Section 5 reviews
research work presently carried out which may offer so-
lutions to new and old problems. Finally, the last section
summarizes the overview. Notice that we do not try to
stick to any conventional way of looking at the problem,
nor do we try to provide an exhaustive survey of existing
work in emergency control. However, we will provide
some additional references for further reading, where ap-
propriate.
2 ASPECTS OF SECURITY CONTROL
Here we attempt to define what security control is all
about, in a general way. Security control is decision
making at different levels of detail and in different time
frames. It starts in (national or international) regulation
bodies which define security criteria and auditing princi-
ples, and ends by paying back customers who have suf-
fered economic loss due to insecurity. Let us briefly enu-
merate the steps as they appear in logical sequence.
Security standards. The explicit definition of security
standards is needed in order to set targets for security
control. Clearly, security standards will depend on the
role played by the electric energy system in the overall
economy, as well as on political choices. The stan-
dards definition must comprise the specification of the
desired levels of reliability, of the means associated to
reach the stated objectives, the rules for allocating re-
sulting costs and the auditing mechanism used for veri-
fication. Generally, at this level it is also decided which
entities (private or public) are technically in charge of
meeting the security standards.
Research. Research basically aims at understanding
how electric power systems behave, in order to pro-
vide predictive models which may be used at the dif-
ferent levels of decision making. Today, the trend in
research is clearly towards exploiting information tech-
nology (computation, database management, commu-
nications), which provides means for improved mod-
eling and security control. Let us notice that since the
electric power system is essentially stochastic, model-
ing should address both physical and probabilistic as-
pects.
Long term investment. Formerly, in the integrated
framework, investment decisions were generally taken
in a coordinated way, combining expansion of gener-
ation and transmission subsystems in an optimal way.
Today, in order to favor competition, in most systems
the investment of generation is a matter of indepen-
dent decision making based mainly on business op-
portunities. Hence, the transmission system invest-
ment must follow in order to maintain desired levels
of security. Building new lines is for the time being
almost impossible in most developed countries, thus
investment might probably focus on improving power
system monitoring and control, by exploiting modern
communication possibilities and power electronics.
Maintenance planning. Decision mak-
ing aims at choosing maintenance plans in such a way
that availability is maximized in periods where higher
traffic on the system is expected. Again, since the gen-
eration subsystem is operated independently by a cer-
tain number of agents, there will be increased needs for
probability methods in order to manage uncertainties.
Also, in order to reduce uncertainties it will be neces-
sary to be more reactive, in order to adapt maintenance
plans smoothly as information becomes available.
Transaction planning. In short term (one day ahead,
typically) transaction planning, the system structure
is essentially fixed and the objective is to arbitrate
among conflicting transactions without discrimination
and while ensuring system security.
Operation. In the control room, the operator receives
real-time information which is used in order to coordi-
nate the scheduled transactions, while reacting to un-
foreseen events (disturbances, outages, unexpected be-
havior. . . ). Part of the operators’ job will be to handle
‘slow’ emergencies, e.g. related to thermal overload
problems or slow voltage collapses.
Emergency control. In this category we focus on auto-
matic control actions such as generation tripping, load-
shedding, controlled islanding. . . We will further elab-
orate on this in the remaining part of the paper.
Restorative control. This aims at re-energizing the sys-
tem after an event which has led to partial or total
blackout. Efficient restorative control is necessary in
order to minimize outage costs. Clearly, strategies for
restorative control need to be coordinated with emer-
gency control schemes.
Post-mortem analysis. Generally, after a major black-
out it is necessary to find out the main causes and
to evaluate the outage costs incurred by the users of
the transmission system. Post-mortem analysis will be
easier if the appropriate information has been stored
during the disturbance and is made readily available to
the analysts.
Financial compensation. After a major event, it is gen-
erally the case that some users should be paid for the
economic losses they have incurred due to the conse-
quences of the outage on their business. The inputs to
these decisions are the results of post-mortem analy-
sis, contractual agreements (possibly) and the rules for
compensation defined in the security standards.
2.1 The objective of security control
Now we focus on the actual system control aspects,
which concern preventive mode security control, emer-
gency mode security control and restorative control. In
the present section we start by formulating the security
control problem from a theoretical point of view, which
is both global and probabilistic.
2.1.1 Two types of costs for security control
Whenever a (preventive, emergency or restorative) con-
trol action is taken, it will essentially imply two types of
“instantaneous” costs : the direct cost of the control ac-
tion and the indirect cost which models the impact of the
control operation on the expected outage cost.1 For ex-
ample, if the control action is to increase some reserve,
the direct cost is the price of the additional reserve which
must be purchased; the effect on the indirect cost could
be measured by the resulting reduction of the expected
outage cost.
Thus, typically the two cost components will vary in
opposite direction (when the direct cost increases the in-
direct cost should decrease), and the purpose of instanta-
neous decision making would be to choose the best trade-
off, i.e. the control action maximizing the overall instan-
taneous benefit (e.g. in dollars per unit of time).
Now, since control actions are to some extent irre-
versible, it is not sufficient in principle to consider only
their instantaneous impact. Also, some control actions
have infinite instantaneous costs (consider, for example,
generator start-up costs) and hence they can be justified
only with a dynamic calculation accounting for expected
future benefits.
Combining these considerations, we summarize by
stating that the primary objective of security control is
to tradeoff various control actions possible (given the
present state of the system, its control resources, and
its expected future), so as to minimize the overall ex-
pected present and future costs. Since the power system is
stochastic and dynamic in nature, from a theoretical point
of view security control is therefore actually a “stochastic
dynamic programming” problem.
2.1.2 Modeling outage costs
It is well known that modeling of outage costs is a very
difficult problem, mainly for two reasons : (i) the incurred
costs depend strongly on the type of customers, and the
duration and geographic extent of an outage will affect
individual costs in a nonlinear fashion; (ii) the duration
and geographic extent of an outage is very difficult to
predict given the multiple uncertainties which will play
a role (how the system behaves in abnormal modes, how
the operator will react during the restoration process. . . ).
We believe however, that it is becoming highly urgent
to develop methodologies to evaluate expected outage
costs, in order to be able to arbitrate correctly among pre-
ventive and emergency control actions and also in order
to justify investment in emergency control plans of exist-
ing and future power systems.
2.1.3 Uncertainties
Where come the uncertainties from ? Well, according to
Murphy’s laws2 everything which is related to the future
is uncertain.
More specifically, in preventive security control uncer-
tainties are mainly of two kinds : external events (random
1The indirect cost term is also referred to as the risk term or expected
severity in the litterature on probabilistic security assessment [6].
2By the time of writing this paper, it is still uncertain whether Kirch-
hoff’s laws will be abolished or not, but we are pretty sure that Murphy’s
laws will survive for a period of time.
processes like weather conditions, tree growing, human
actions, market chaos. . . ) and internal system reactions
(failures of protections, unexpected load behavior,. . . ).
In emergency control, the main uncertainty concerning
external triggering events disappears in part at least, as
well as the slower processes such as market trends and
operator actions. The other uncertainties, concerning in-
ternal behavior will remain in place.
In the restoration phase, the operator is faced with a
system in a very unusual situation, and often the way the
system will react to his control actions is very difficult to
predict.
2.2 On the need for decomposition
The global security control problem viewed as a stochas-
tic dynamic programming problem is essentially in-
tractable, for several reasons. For one, there are many
control variables which may act in different time scales.
In addition, as was already mentioned, the explicit trade-
off between direct and indirect costs is not yet feasible be-
cause we still do not have an agreed methodology to de-
termine expected outage costs. Let us consider the prac-
tical ways to decompose this problem into more tractable
subproblems.
2.2.1 Decomposition by costs
The first level of decomposition which is today carried
out concerns the tradeoff between direct and indirect
costs. Decomposition by costs consists in replacing the
evaluation of indirect costs (i.e. expected outage costs)
by an a priori choice of deterministic security criteria.
For example, in most utilities it is decided a priori that
preventive control actions should minimize direct costs
under some constraints which are chosen so as to indi-
rectly limit the long run expected value of indirect costs.
These constraints are typically of the n   1 type: any
preventive state is declared as acceptable from the view-
point of the indirect costs, if it meets a certain number of
constraints with respect to a certain number of postulated
contingencies and with respect to a reference model (i.e.
the uncertainties concerning the power system behavior
are not taken into account explicitly).
The main advantage of this approach is to free the en-
gineer from considerations about probabilistic models,
since now the original problem of stochastic dynamic
programming is translated into (i.e. approximated by) a
deterministic dynamic optimization problem. In the con-
text of real-time (control room) decision making, the lat-
ter problem is generally in turn approximated by a static
optimal control problem.
Clearly, while this approach has the “tremendous” ad-
vantage of feasibility, it makes sense only as far as the
constraints, contingency lists and models are chosen so as
to reflect correctly the indirect costs. Of course, the deter-
ministic approach is unable to take into account variations
in time of probabilities of external disturbances (e.g. due
to changing weather conditions) and hence intrinsically
suboptimal. Furthermore, we believe that in the future
indirect costs might fluctuate significantly due to trading,
in a similar fashion as energy prices fluctuate in an open
market structure. Hence, there will be pressure to define
security constraints in a more flexible way so as to reflect
correctly the actual indirect costs.
Notice that the decomposition by costs also results
in the decomposition between preventive and emergency
control by associating different sets of constraints to
the two subproblems. Typically, preventive control uses
constraints defined using the more likely contingencies
whereas emergency control is supposed to cover unex-
pected events.
2.2.2 Physical decomposition
As was said in the introduction, the power system is a
complex highly nonlinear system. Hence, it is both nec-
essary and possible to decompose problems in various
ways. In security control, and more specifically in emer-
gency control, the decomposition can be appropriately
made both in space and in time.
Decomposition in time. Starting with fast and ending
with slow phenomena we enumerate the following sub-
problems.
Fast transient behavior. Loss of synchronism (as well
as very fast voltage collapses) need very fast emer-
gency control schemes to be avoided, with triggering
delays reduced to a fraction of a second.
Fast collapses. Fast voltage or frequency collapses may
evolve with time constants of a few seconds.
Undamped oscillations. Undamped oscillations may
take longer time to build up, between tens of seconds
to some minutes.
Slow collapses. Particularly, OLTC3 driven voltage col-
lapse takes typically a few minutes.
Cascading trippings. Overloaded line trippings are typ-
ically slow enough to allow operator intervention.
Although the above decomposition is classical, it is well
known also that there are interactions among the different
phenomena. For example, slower phenomena may induce
faster ones, or fast control actions may lead to situations
where slow control actions become necessary. On the
other hand, the structure of a given power system may re-
sult in some phenomena being more likely to happen than
others : for example, fast breaker tripping has resulted in
strongly reducing the probability of loss of synchronism
in many systems; however, change in generation patterns
may result in new system oscillation modes which had
disappeared in many modern power systems thanks to the
installation of PSSs4.
Decomposition in space. Some of the above problems
have global impact and hence are difficult to further de-
compose.
Some others (e.g. voltage collapse problems) are in-
herently local and are easier to decompose in a geo-
graphic manner.
However, due to the nonlinear behavior the interactions
among phenomena may be sensitive to the way the sys-
tem is operating. In particular, the geographic extent of
3OLTC: on-load tap-changers
4PSS: power system stabilizer
the phenomena will depend significantly on the genera-
tion patterns, and clearly generation patterns are becom-
ing more uncertain in the future. Hence, we believe that
the geographical decomposition has to be re-examined
from time to time, and emergency control schemes should
be designed in such a way that they can be reconfigured
if needed.
2.3 Implementation concerns
2.3.1 Coordination
Decomposition calls for coordination : among different
control areas and among control subsystems responsible
for different physical subproblems.
On the other hand, it is important to feedback appropri-
ate economic signals to the external part of the power sys-
tem (generation companies, load aggregators, and large
industrial customers) so as to allocate resources in a glob-
ally optimal fashion. An appropriate mechanism for feed-
ing such signals back could be provided by flexible trans-
mission charges and contracts for financial compensation
of controlled outages.
2.3.2 Monitoring
An important part of security control is monitoring the
state of the system, recording the various events which
appear and metering non-deserved energy at different lo-
cations in the system. This information is necessary both
in order to take the appropriate decisions in real-time and
to carry out the appropriate post-mortem analysis so as to
settle for financial compensation and auditing.
Clearly not all the information has to transit in real-
time through fast communication channels. However, in
order to exploit the information it is necessary to use pre-
cise enough and globally synchronised time stamps. The
real-time monitoring system should also be designed in
a client/server architecture which would allow flexible
enough reconfiguration possibilities in the future, as new
needs become apparent.
2.3.3 Redundancy and closed loop operation
In order to reach a certain level of reliability, the critical
parts of the emergency control plan should be duplicated
and open loop control should be avoided to the extent
possible (which is not always the case).
Closed loop control is in principle more robust with re-
spect to uncertainties, as far as it is using reliable and fast
enough communication channels together with appropri-
ate and accurate enough real-time measurements.
The geographical and physical decompositions of
emergency control schemes often introduces some nat-
ural redundancy into the system : for example if a coor-
dinated global defense plan fails, local devices may still
act on in order to mitigate consequences.
2.3.4 Local versus centralized schemes
Local schemes are generally preferred because they are
intrinsically more robust and less expensive to imple-
ment. Also, in some cases the transmission delays would
prevent a centralized scheme from operating correctly.
On the other hand, when possible, centralized schemes
may be more effective since they would base control ac-
tions on a better picture of the system and may exploit a
larger set of candidate control actions. They may there-
fore reduce direct and indirect costs, at the price of more
expensive equipment and smaller reliability.
Given the fact that in many actual power systems, ex-
isting emergency devices are mainly local devices dis-
tributed thoughout the system, it is suggested that central-
ized schemes may be added on top in order to make bet-
ter use of the existing devices. The centralized schemes
could be used in two different modes: adaptive mode
where they would be used in order to adapt parameters
of the local controllers (say delays and thresholds); co-
ordination mode where they would be used in order to
handle situations which need coordination (e.g. synchro-
nization) between local controllers.
3 EXISTING EC SCHEMES
In order to fix ideas, we will give in this section a very
brief overview of existing emergency control schemes,
without aiming at being exhaustive. We suggest to con-
sider references [13, 7, 27] for a more in depth analysis
of present practices and trends.
3.1 Different philosophies
There are mainly to different types of schemes: open loop
and closed loop systems.
3.1.1 Open loop
These systems are mainly event driven, in the following
sense: in preventive mode (on-line or off-line), simula-
tions are carried out in order to predict how the system
would behave under some contingencies and to deter-
mine whether and how an emergency control action could
solve the problem. Once the emergency control action
and the conditions under which it should be applied have
been determined, relays are armed in an appropriate way.
The relays triggering is then based on the reception of a
signal from standard protections. Normally, the scheme
acts in an “all or nothing” fashion and results in tripping
some generators or loads from the system.
The advantages of the scheme are speed, reliability
and predictability, which are essentially of the same or-
der than classical relaying and protections. This is the
reason why this scheme may be used to handle both fast
phenomena and likely contingencies (see below).
3.1.2 Closed loop
Closed loop systems are based on real-time measure-
ments, sometimes they use specially designed commu-
nication channels and measurement devices in order to
operate in a sufficiently reliable and fast way.
During the design stage, the appropriate signals and
control logics are determined, and in real-time the sys-
tem will act continuously according to the logic and val-
ues of real-time measurements. For example, in a simple
under-frequency load shedding scheme, the measurement
is local frequency and the scheme will trip a certain per-
centage of load each time the frequency drops below a
certain threshold for a certain duration of time. After the
system has acted, it is automatically rearmed, which al-
lows further control actions to be applied if the result is
not satisfactory.
The difficulty with such closed loop schemes are the
following: (i) for some phenomena it may be difficult to
obtain predictive enough real-time measurements; (ii) it
is difficult to predict under which conditions the emer-
gency control system will trigger, since this may depend
strongly on the disturbances and on the way the system
reacts (which are both uncertain). On the other hand, the
main advantage, inherent from the closed loop nature, is
precisely robustness with respect to uncertainties.
3.2 Transient stability
Transient (angle) instability emergency control schemes
mainly depend on the structure of the power system and
on the type of generation equipment used. For example,
for thermal generators fast-valving may be efficient based
on real-time measures of accelerations and speeds, while
for hydro-generation tripping may be very effective due
to the fact that hydro-generation may be restarted quickly
and because the discrete nature of this control action is
often compensated by the smaller size of individual gen-
erators.
One of the most sophisticated systems presently in
place is the system used by Electricite´ de France [32].
It consists basically of three subsystems:
Generation control: transient excitation boosting and
fast-valving in thermal power plants based on accel-
eration and rotor speed, in order to prevent loss of syn-
chronism.
Local islanding: out-of-step relay based tripping of
lines, using local measurements.
Coordinated defense plan: centralized special protec-
tion scheme using synchronized phase measurements,
coordinating line tripping to isolate a large area loos-
ing synchronism with load shedding in the remaining
system to compensate for the loss of power in tie lines.
It is worth mentioning that in this scheme all three levels
are of the closed loop type. They are supposed to act only
in very abnormal situations.
Another type of scheme, of the open loop type is
the generation shedding system used in North-America
mainly in hydro-plants [31]. In this scheme, the trip-
ping of a certain number of generators in specific power
plants is associated to the tripping of some line in the
EHV transmission system. Usually, the determination of
control actions and arming conditions are made off-line
in the study environment. On-line, in preventive mode,
the system is armed or not, depending on state estimator
results (e.g. power flow levels in lines) and in real-time
only relay signals are used.
Finally, let us mention also the TSC (transient stabil-
ity control) system developed by Chubu Electric Power
Company [21], in Japan. This system combines on-line
preventive mode transient stability evaluation to deter-
mine the optimal location of generators to be shed for
different contingencies, with real-time event driven (i.e.
open loop) generator shedding.
3.3 Voltage stability
In contrast to transient angle instability which is always a
fast and system wide phenomenon, voltage stability prob-
lems may be more or less local and of variable speed.
Fast or “short-term” voltage instability problems may
appear within seconds after a contingency and are gener-
ally driven by loads which have small recovery times (ex-
amples are industrial induction motors and power elec-
tronics driven devices). In this case, under-voltage load
shedding is an attractive concept which may be imple-
mented using existing technology and local devices [30].
Slower “long-term’ voltage instability phenomena are
usually related to tap changer driven dynamics. In this
case, a natural control action is to prevent the tap chang-
ers from restoring the voltage at the load side. Usually,
tap changer blocking devices use as signal EHV voltages
with thresholds and delays appropriately set on the ba-
sis of simulations. Given the fact that EHV voltage are
not necessarily the best indicators of voltage collapse,
and given the fact that thresholds on these latter may be
variable, other signals such as reactive reserves might be
preferable.
Notice that in the case of slower voltage instabilities,
the objective of automatic emergency control may be re-
duced to slow down the phenomena enough to allow man-
ual (operator driven) control to take place in time. Op-
erator control may result in load shedding or start-up of
fast local generation if available. Another possible auto-
matic control action which may be used in order to miti-
gate slower voltage collapse is secondary voltage control,
comprizing coordinated changes in reactive generation
of synchronous machines and static var compensators as
well as switching of reactive compensation (capacitors or
reactors). Also, because the phenomena are essentially
quasi static, this type of emergency control scheme may
be centralized and implemented through regional control
center SCADA5 systems.
3.4 Frequency collapse
In a large interconnected system, frequency collapse is
generally the result of islanding and thus appears in prac-
tice only when other problems have already occurred (e.g.
loss of synchronism or cascading losses of lines). On the
other hand, in a smaller isolated system frequency col-
lapse would be the result of loss of generation above the
primary reserve. Normally both events are very unlikely
to happen or at least highly unpredictable. Hence, event
driven emergency control is not very appropriate.
Thus, typically emergency control is based on real-
time measurements of frequency and its derivative [15].
A notable exception is the coordinated defense plan of the
EDF system, where islanding of an area exporting a large
amount of power is synchronised with load shedding in
the external part of the system [32].
3.5 Thermal overloads
Upon the inception of abnormal contingencies, thermal
overloads may occur in the EHV system. The time con-
stants depend on the type of equipment and the impor-
tance of the overload : lines may support overloads dur-
5SCADA: supervisory control and data acquisition
ing several minutes (depending on weather conditions)
while transformers will generally trip after a few seconds.
In general, overload tripping starts slowly but it may
induce quickly accelerating cascading events. Once the
cascades of overloaded line tripping starts, it is gener-
ally very difficult to stop it, in particular because it may
induce voltage collapses and result in undervoltage trip-
pings of machines. So, the main difficulty is to reduce
quickly enough the power flows in the overloaded lines
so as to prevent it from tripping and induce cascades.
Often, the slower emergencies are handled by direct
operator intervention (e.g. by shedding load or genera-
tion), but in some cases automatic emergency control de-
vices have also been implemented in order to avoid cas-
cading trippings.
3.6 Synthesis
The preceding brief overview of existing strategies and
systems for emergency control aimed at highlighting the
diversity of problems and approaches, and the fact that al-
though there is a logical approach to decompose the prob-
lem, its solution is made difficult due to interactions and
uncertainties. Among the main uncertainties which inter-
fere with emergency control let us mention load behavior
and the unreliability of independent generation’s solidar-
ity, which may be expected in the future.
Also, the complexity of the protection systems in-
stalled in modern power systems results in a certain brit-
tleness of the overall system. For example, when ex-
amining the large blackouts which have occurred in the
past, it is generally the case that among the underlying
causes one finds unexpected behavior of some protection
devices, either due to internal failure or due to mis-tuned
parameters.
3.7 Further reading
In addition to the already mentioned references we sug-
gest the following publications on existing emergency
control systems [3, 28, 2, 8, 11, 1, 25].
4 TECHNOLOGICAL OPPORTUNITIES
In this section we will briefly discuss the main techno-
logical factors which may influence how emergency con-
trol will be tackled in the future : modeling, probabilis-
tic approaches, computing power, direct control methods,
communications and measurement techniques.
Some of these possibilities will be illustrated explicitly
in the last section of the paper.
Measurement devices. Low cost of hardware already
makes it possible to improve significantly the real-time
picture available to emergency control systems.
For example, synchronised phasor measurement de-
vices have been installed throughout the WSCC system in
order to record huge amounts of detailed and precise mea-
surements in real-time. This information may be used in
order to improve dynamic models and as input signals to
emergency control schemes [5].
Communications. Cost of standard communications
decreases and more significantly flexibility and speed in-
creases very quickly. Most present communication sys-
tems used in power systems have been designed long ago
in a static hierarchical way.
With today’s technology it becomes possible to recon-
figure communication servers and clients in real-time.
For some of the emergency control problems, it would
be possible to use Internet technology in the near future,
which would allow for low cost highly flexible commu-
nication links between substations and control centers.6
Power electronics. Given the fact that transmission
systems will be operated and planned independently from
generation and load, the possibility to increase the flexi-
bility of the transmission system through the use of power
electronics may play an important role in the future.
Although the investment in FACTS7 devices is not as
fast as anticipated, we may foresee that in the future this
technology will become more or less unavoidable.
System theory methods. Recent progress in system
theory and simulation techniques makes it possible to ex-
ploit more realistic models in the design of emergency
control schemes.
For example, on-line DSA8 becomes slowly a reality.
On-line DSA may be exploited in the future in the context
of both preventive and emergency control.
Computing hardware. Low cost and ever increasing
speed of computers makes the use of simulation easy. In
most applications of security control there are huge op-
portunities for parallel computations provided that some
additional tools are developed.
Databases. Database technology has evolved in the re-
cent years so as to allow the storage and efficient retrieval
of huge amounts of information in geographically dis-
tributed repositories.
The existence of such huge amounts of data accumu-
lated through time in various fields has led to the devel-
opment of a new field called “data mining” [19]. Data
mining basically allows one to extract synthetic knowl-
edge from large databases using statistical methods based
on automatic learning.
In the context of emergency control, data mining could
be used in order to improve models and make better use
of existing simulation tools at the design stage [18]. This
is further discussed below.
Information theory. Information theory was founded
by Claude Shannon immediately after the second world
war. Since then, it has been among the main responsi-
bles for the progress in informatics and communications
in this century. It provides the theoretical and practical
tools to asses the value of information in decision mak-
ing, to study the effect of uncertainties and the means to
fight against random behavior of systems.
6This is not meant to replace but rather to supplement existing
communications.
7FACTS: flexible AC transmission systems
8DSA: dynamic (voltage or transient stability) security assessment
In particular, information theory provides high level
concepts in order to exploit probabilistic models and con-
trol stochastic systems. Among the recent developments
in information theory we may mention efficient channel
coding methods, automatic learning theory and applica-
tion of information theory in game theory and to stock
markets [9].
More specifically, we believe that the use of infor-
mation theory in emergency control may allow one to
identify appropriate measurements for emergency control
schemes, and to evaluate the technical and financial ben-
efit of introducing redundancy and adaptability in the ex-
isting defense plans.
Information theory is also at the basis of automatic
learning techniques which will be further discussed in our
practical context in the next section.
5 PRESENT RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
In this last section we will discuss some recent work
which has been carried out at the University of Lie`ge in
the context of emergency control. We use this work in
order to illustrate different philosophies, which we be-
lieve representative of work carried out by many teams.
Unfortunately, during the writing of this paper, time was
too short to collect more references of other related work.
Hence, we appologize for not citing this work.
5.1 System theory based approaches
In this category we classify those approaches which are
mainly based on the use of analytical models or on the
exploitation of principles from system theory.
5.1.1 Voltage collapse
We briefly summarize the philosophy behind the work re-
ported by our colleagues in [17, 16].
Optimal load shedding. Reference [17] describes a
method based on the use of a fast long-term voltage in-
stability simulation tool called ASTRE. By its very na-
ture, the tool focuses on long-term voltage instabilities,
i.e. those driven by OLTC devices and possibly thermo-
static loads.
The idea consists in using information gained from the
simulation of an unstable system trajectory in order to:
 identify the instability mode, which is defined as the
point in the load power space where the system crosses
the bifurcation surface (i.e. the bounding surface of the
region of existence of a stable operating point) together
with the normal vector at this point;
 determine from the above information and from the
point in the load power space characterizing the pre-
disturbance load value (load demand), an appropriate
direction of control in the load-power space. In prac-
tice, this takes on the form of a list of candidate buses
ranked by decreasing efficiency of load shedding;
 determine the minimal amount of load to be shed at
each bus, for a given delay of load shedding and taking
into account the optimal unconstrained control direc-
tion together with constraints (amount of interruptible
load at each bus);
 the procedure is repeated for different delays in order
to find the best delay in order to minimize the total
amount of load shed.
In this procedure, the instability mode is thus obtained
as a direct by-product of a single simulation. On the other
hand, optimal values of amount of control and delays are
obtained by an iterative procedure which relies on repet-
itive simulations, which are feasible thanks to the effi-
ciency of the used simulation tool.
One of the interesting observations reported in the
above reference [17] is the fact that the amount of load
shed (i.e. the resulting outage cost) is strongly dependent
on the delay used for deciding when to act. On one hand,
load shedding should take place as late as possible in or-
der to avoid undue action (in low voltage but stable cases)
and allow other possible control actions to be taken (e.g.
compensation switching, where available). On the other
hand, it can be shown that beyond some point in time, the
longer one wait to shed, the more one has to shed. This
point in time may vary quite a lot with the disturbance.
For severe disturbances it may be required to shed some
load right after the disturbance (after electromechanical
oscillations have died out).
On the other hand, it is well known that early detec-
tion of voltage instability is difficult, since it takes some
time to observe that EHV voltages decrease. Also, the
speed with which the system will go towards the bifurca-
tion surface will depend in practice on the way the load
responds to voltage drops. Hence clearly, delays and even
instability modes may be difficult to asses given the fact
that load models are highly uncertain.
Design of emergency control devices. In [16] the au-
thor suggests how to combine the above method with
heuristic search (genetic algorithms are suggested by the
author as a nice tool in this case), in order to tune pa-
rameters of a “postulated” control device so as to shed an
optimal amount of load. The postulated control device is
supposed to operate in closed loop; it may either be an
existing scheme or one proposed by the design egineer
during the overal design process.
The idea is to use the above method in order (i) to de-
termine the amount of load to shed for a set of unstable
scenarios; (ii) to use the simplified simulation tool AS-
TRE in order to check whether, for a given choice of the
control device parameters, the system is stable or unsta-
ble.
The resulting control device tuning may require a very
large number of simulations; however, since this task is
carried out off-line and may be parallelized quite easily,
we do not see any major difficulty in terms of computan-
tional feasibility.
Discussion. One advantage of the above approach is
its generality: it may be in principle used for any kind
of control device structure (although the tuning may be-
come overwhelming if the number of parameters to tune
becomes very large). While focus above is on load shed-
ding, the method may be extended to handle other control
actions such as reactive compensation switching and fast
generation start-up.
The above methodology shows how progress in dy-
namic simulation tools, may be used to select, in a more
or less automatic way, parameters of controllers. It is
hence representative of research carried out by different
teams throughout the world. For exemple, reference [24]
describes a similar idea to use time domain simulation
and optimization in order to determine control parame-
ters for a special stability control system against loss of
synchronism. Other research work was carried out at CE-
PEL in the context of coordinated and robust tuning of
power system stabilizers [29].
One main drawback of simulation based controller or
protection tuning is related to modelling uncertainties and
due to the fact that the simulations have to be carried
out for a certain number of postulated contingencies. Of
course, in principle the method may use a sufficiently
broad range of simulation scenarios, including various
load models so as to yield a sufficiently robust design.
On the other hand, it would be interesting to be able to
identify also the structure of the controller (which mea-
surements to use, and how complex de set of rules should
be). How to do this in a very general and flexible way
is precisely the topic of section 5.2, which suggests that
the simulation scenarios should be sampled using a prop-
erly desgned probabilistic model, and that the design and
validation of controllers may be achieved using data min-
ing tools and automatic learning to extract information
from database of simulated scenarios. Automatic learn-
ing methods are able to identify the appropriate measure-
ments and adapt the complexity of extracted rules to the
information contained in the simulated scenarios (prob-
lem complexity and representativity of the data base).
5.1.2 Loss of synchronism
Let us describe another research presently pursued at the
University of Lie`ge, in the context of transient angle in-
stability emergency control [37].
Here the idea is to use real-time measurements of the
dynamic state variables of the system in order to deter-
mine closed loop control actions. In the most simple
scheme, the method’s principle merely consists of using
real-time measurements of “synchronous” machines’ an-
gles, speeds and accelerations, in order to predict whether
the system is in the process of loosing synchronism or
not. In order to predict instability the real-time measure-
ments are combined using the SIME method [38], which
identifies the mode of instability (critical cluster of ma-
chines) and provides indications on how much and which
generation to shed. The overall system may be used in a
closed loop fashion, which makes it robust with respect
to modeling uncertainties and types of contingencies.
The main difficulty with the present scheme is re-
lated to telecommunication delays, which may reduce the
speed of the control system to the extent that it becomes
ineffective. On the other hand, the method in its present
status is only able to handle control actions which act on
the active power of generators. However, other controls
such as SVC and generator voltage boosting, fast active
power re-routing using FACTS and DC line modulation,
dynamic breaking and SMES9 should be considered also
9SMES: superconducting magnetic energy storage device
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Figure 1: A priori information : probabilistic model and physical model
in the future.
Thus, further research is needed in order to determine
appropriate strategies to implement this type of control
in practice. Among the topics to be considered we men-
tion the trade-off between local and centralized control,
the combination with open loop control in case of very
fast loss of synchronism and the design of other types of
control actions.
5.2 Automatic learning approaches
Another research direction which is essentially comple-
mentary to the system theory type of methods described
above, concerns the application of automatic learning
to the design of emergency control devices. Automatic
learning based approaches to emergency control rely on
a general statistical framework, which has also been ap-
plied in the context of other power system problems, no-
tably preventive security assessment. We will describe
below the work carried out in collaboration between the
University of Lie`ge and Electricite´ de France [35], and
at the end of this section we will mention other relevant
work.
5.2.1 Overall principle
The approach consists in two main steps : database gener-
ation using Monte-Carlo simulations of dynamic security
scenarios, and database analysis using automatic learning
[35]. Note that the Monte-Carlo approach is well suited
to the intrinsically probabilistic nature of the problem
(think about the random nature of external disturbances,
failures of protection devices, mistuned settings. . . ). On
the other hand, automatic learning techniques are (by def-
inition) designed so as to separate predictable informa-
tion from the random component.
As sketched generically in Fig. 1, the Monte-Carlo
simulations require two models : the probabilistic model
(for random sampling), and the system dynamic model
(for numerical simulation).
The probabilistic model (see Fig. 1) represents a priori
knowledge about initial operating points (OP), external
disturbances and inputs (ED) and other modeling param-
eters used in a dynamic simulation (MH). Notice that this
scheme allows one to represent probabilities of failures
of protection devices, ranges of possible model parame-
ters of external systems or aggregated load areas. . . . All
this information is symbolized by a parameter vector (
in Fig. 1) which defines a simulation scenario, and is fed
later on into the physical model, in order to simulate the
corresponding trajectory.
The design of the probabilistic model is generally the
most difficult and at the same time the most important
modeling step in this approach. The chosen probability
distributions incorporate all prior knowledge as well as
the definition of the range of conditions which the study
aims to cover. In addition, the probability distributions
may be biased in order to increase the probability of sam-
pling those parts of the space which are interesting (e.g.
close to the security boundary).
The dynamic model is as usual a set of differential and
algebraic equations which define the analytical relation-
ships among states, parameters, time, measurements (de-
noted by z(t) in Fig. 1) and scenario severity indicators
(denoted by s(t) in Fig. 1). For instance, in the con-
text of defense plan design, the candidate measurements
would be all those variables which can be used as inputs
by the emergency control scheme, whereas the indica-
tors would denote the information which would be ob-
served in case no control action is taken (e.g. expected
outage cost). Thus in order to design a triggering rule, it
is necessary in some way to predict the future values of
the scenario severity s, given present and past values of
measurements z. In general, S and Y are random vari-
ables (actually random processes). Thus, at some time
t, a synthetic model is used to predict S at some future
time, t0  t, using the already observed values of mea-
surements fz()g
t
. This is suggested in Fig. 2, where
the estimate is provided by the conditional expectation of
this random variable given the already observed values of
Z (notation s^(t0)  E
Sjz
fSjfz(g
t
gg).
Such a prediction model provides normally only an ap-
proximation of this conditional expectation, which, be-
cause it can not be computed analytically in practice,
must be estimated from a random sample of input/output
pairs. Thus, as is suggested by Fig. 2, the design of
such prediction models is carried out in the presented ap-
proach using automatic learning applied to random sam-
ples generated by Monte-Carlo simulations. As we will
see, this requires, for each indicator variable which has to
be predicted, the propper identification of relevant mea-
surements (those parts of y which carry indeed informa-
tion about the future value of z) and the design of a syn-
thetic model which will estimate severity as precisely as
possible.
Notice that in practical applications (see also below),
both z and s are vectors of variables which combine dis-
crete (breaker status, relay trip. . . ) and numerical in-
formation (voltage magnitudes, amount of load shedded,
. . . ).
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Figure 2: Information extracted by AL : expected value of future severity given past measurements
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Figure 3: Voltage collapse prediction tree
5.2.2 Toolbox of AL methods
We will not provide any details about automatic learning
methods per se (see for example [34]). Rather, we men-
tion several complementary methods which can be used
in practice. We will distinguish among supervised learn-
ing (which aims at building models able to predict some
selected output variables on the basis of some particular
input variables) and unsupervised learning (which aims at
discovering similarities, in the form of groups of similar
scenarios, or sets of correlated variables).
In the realm of supervised learning we mention the fol-
lowing methods:
 Decision and regression trees which are able to provide
interpretable information, in particular identify rele-
vant input variables for other methods (se also their
recent extensions : fuzzy trees and temporal trees
[4, 10]).
 Non-linear regression techniques, such as multilayer
perceptrons and projection pursuit techniques, which
essentially offer the possibility to model continuous in-
put/ouput relationships in a very flexible way.
 Nearest neighbor or similarity based techniques, which
offer the possibility to identify in a database scenarios
similar to a given one.
In the realm of unsupervised learning we merely men-
tion de classical K-means algorithm (which is used be-
low), hierarchical agglomerative clustering (which may
be used to analyse correlations among variables) and Ko-
honen feature maps (which offer some interesting inter-
pretation capabilities) [34].
Temporal decision trees. Note that most of the vari-
ables used in the context of blackout analysis and emer-
gency control design are of temporal nature. Thus
the proper exploitation of this information may call for
data mining methods specifically designed for temporal
databases. There is presently a significant amount of re-
search carried out in this context. In particular, we men-
tion here the temporal tree induction method described in
[10], which was specifically designed in order to achieve
a good compromize between selectivity and anticipativ-
ity of detection. Figure 3 illustrates a temporal decision
tree built with this method in the context of the study de-
scribed below. This tree uses temporal input variables
(voltage magnitudes and excitation currents of genera-
tors) in order to detect as anticipatively as possible a volt-
age collapse in some part of the system.
The tree detects voltage collapse by percolating scenar-
ios downwards the tree. Along each arc of the tree a tem-
poral test is installed (e.g. on the upper left arc the test is
“U1 < 220.5 j 5”, which means that the test becomes true
as soon as the voltage at the 225kV bus1 has remained be-
low the threshold of 220.5kV during at least 5 seconds).
A scenario will reach a terminal node, in which case a
voltage collapse is detected, only if all the tests leading
towards that node eventually become true. Note that in
such a temporal tree the tests leading to different termi-
nal nodes are not mutually complementary and exclusive.
Random Sampling
Slave
Slave
Slave
Slave
Slave
Simulator input files
DB
Scenarios
A
Data Base
Results
Specs
A
priori posteriori
Simulation engine
Master
Extracted ground parameters and status
OP
OPs
OP=operating point
ED=external disturbances
ED
EDs
MH=dynamic behavior hypothesis
MH
MHs
Figure 4: Parallel simulation of scenarios
Hence, a given scenario may never reach a terminal node
(in this case it is considered stable). Otherwise, it might
reach several terminal nodes, and it is detected as a volt-
age collapse as soon as it reaches one of these latter.
During the tree building, the method installs tests in a
greedy fashion so as to detect as early as possible the truly
unstable scenarios, while retaining at its internal nodes all
(or a maximum number of) stable scenarios.
5.2.3 Summary
To sumarize, the overall approach proceeds as follows:
 Design of the probabilistic and physical models for the
particular problem under consideration (expert judg-
ment, statistical information. . . ).
 Random sampling of a certain number of simulation
scenarios according to the probabilistic model and nu-
merical simulation of these latter (this is achieved au-
tomatically, in parallel to speed up computations, and
yields a database of simulation results : system trajec-
tories in the most general case).
 Application of various automatic learning methods to
extract information from the latter database, or some of
its subsets (this step involves again expert judgment,
and a toolbox of complementary automatic learning
and information extraction methods, known as data
mining toolbox).
5.2.4 Comments
Below we make some comments on the current status of
the overall approach and provide some hints on research
areas which have still to be explored.
Database generation. In order to reduce the number of
required simulation scenarios, the Monte-Carlo sampling
may artificially increase the probabilities of various types
of failures, and sample only combinations of severe dis-
turbances. In other words, the probabilistic model may be
biased in order to sample predominantly those regions in
the measurement space where the variance of the severity
indicators is high. In the literature on Monte-Carlo sim-
ulations there are several well known variance reduction
techniques which may be used for that purpose (see e.g.
[26], and also the literature on optimal experiment design
[12]).
However, the coupling of such techniques with auto-
matic learning is more intricate and there is still much
work to be done in this field (see also the literature on
query based learning and reinforcement learning).
For the time being we used the approach by biasing the
probability distributions in an ad hoc way, so as to con-
centrate the simulations in the regions where prior exper-
tise tells us that most information can be gained. Note
that without biasing the random sampling it would be
necessary to generate huge amounts of scenarios in order
to gather some interesting blackout situations. However,
while biased probabilities were used for the random sam-
pling, we keep track of the “actual” probabilities while
generating the database so as to enable correct interpreta-
tion of the results.
Numerical simulation tools. In principle the approach
can be used with any numerical simulation tool deemed
sufficiently accurate for the problem under consideration.
Note however that in the context of defense plan design
a rather detailed dynamic model should be used, able to
simulate both slow and fast dynamics and various protec-
tive devices, so as to assess the performance of the system
with good accuracy.
Thus, the database generation generally calls for par-
allel computations in order to be able to carry out sev-
eral thousands of dynamic simulations with acceptable
response times. In the study on the EHV system of Elec-
tricite´ de France sketched in the next section, 12 CPUs
were thus used in parallel for the simulations (see Fig.
4).
Flexibility w.r.t. prior assumptions. The database
analysis is an iterative “data mining” process. Experts use
a data mining tool in order to find out the most frequent
blackout modes, and to study relationships among differ-
ent phenomena. The data mining tool comprises various
graphical visualization modules able to show the infor-
mation contained in the database, as well as a toolbox
of automatic learning methods, already briefly discussed.
Below we suggest different ways of using them in the
context of the proposed approach.
Note that in traditional practice, in order to cope with
the overall complexity of the problem, the experts use
a divide-and-conquer approach, where the problem is a
priori decomposed into simpler subproblems on a geo-
graphical and/or phenomena-wise base. If the system is
undergoing changes this may be misleading, since exper-
tise becomes more quickly obsolete and the “chance” of
missing some potential risks is increased.
In the proposed approach, the principle is quite differ-
ent. The problem is addressed a priori in a global way :
the Monte-Carlo probabilistic model is designed in or-
der to represent all reasonably possible causes of collapse
(together with their relative probability) and the dynamic
simulation model is designed so as to allow the study of
both slow and fast phenomena. The geographical and
phenomena-wise decomposition is carried out a posteri-
ori by looking at the database of simulation results with
the help of automatic learning. This allows one in prin-
ciple to study interactions among various phenomena, if
they happen, and to identify the most likely consequences
in a more objective way.
However, during the database generation it is not nec-
essary to restrict the amount of information which will be
stored and available later for analysis. Actually, it is ad-
visable to keep trace of all variables which could be used
either as real-time measurements (inputs to emergency
control device triggering criteria) or in order to define the
scenario severity. The data mining tools offer the possi-
bility to combine these variables in a very flexible way
in order to build synthetic models. Note also that input
and output variables may be either numerical continuous
(analog states and measurements) or discrete events (fault
occurrence, relay tripping, breaker opering/reclosure. . . ).
Managing large temporal databases. While a couple
of years ago, databases which could be handled by data
mining tools were rather small (several tens of MBytes),
today it is current practice to apply these tools to very
large amounts of data (several hundred GBytes). Since
mass storage and CPU power are cheaper and cheaper,
there is strong incentive to keep a maximum amount of
information from the simulations. Nevertheless, it may
be necessary to filter and/or compress the raw outputs
provided by the simulation engine.
For example, in the study on the French power sys-
tem, the total amount of raw simulation results produced
during the database generation was about 300 GBytes
(sic). In order to bring storage requirements and process-
ing times to an acceptable value, this information was re-
duced by a factor of about 200 by using appropriate data
compression techniques.
5.2.5 Identification of collapse modes
Using illustrations from a real study, let us show how
unsupervised learning methods may be used in order to
find out the various modes of failure of the system. Note
that these latter generally involve a combination of exter-
nal faults with cascading line trippings (overloads), volt-
age collapse and loss of synchronism, intermingled with
the action of various special stability controls already in-
stalled on the system.
The approach described was developed using a
database generated for the French EHV system [35]. This
database contains 1500 scenarios simulated for the study
of the South-Eastern part of the French EHV system.
The simulation model used about 11,000 state variables
and represented in detail the dynamics of the European
interconnection surrounding the study area. Each sce-
nario was simulated during a long enough period (about
40-50 minutes) to observe cascading line tripping (over-
load relays) and their interactions with voltage and angle
dynamics. All relevant special protection systems were
modeled: coordinated defense plan, islanding schemes,
low-voltage protections in substations, controlled gener-
ation tripping, under-frequency load-shedding, automatic
tap-changer blocking schemes. . .
The objectives of the study were as follows:
 Identification of the main weaknesses of the system,
without prior hypothesis on the dynamic profile of in-
stabilities.
 Identification of (combinations) of disturbances capa-
ble of initiating a system collapse.
 For each threatening disturbance, identification of the
final consequences and the dynamic profile of the col-
lapse.
Methodology. During the study, a methododogy was
developed in order to reach the above objective. It goes
in 4 main steps:
 Definition of a notion of collapse severity.
This measures the impact of the dynamics on con-
sumption, generation and transmission in terms of how
much equipement of each kind is tripped at a given
stage of the scenario. All in all about 30 temporal vari-
ables were used in order to provide a picture of sce-
nario severity with a good enough spatial resolution.
 Regrouping scenarios considering the final state (con-
sequences).
This regrouping was carried out using the K-means
clustering algorithm and as attributes the former 30 at-
tributes values at the end of the simulation period (final
state severity).
 Subdividing each collapse group according to the dy-
namics (the main steps of the blackout).
 In depth analysis of each group, in order to character-
ize:
– the nature (fast versus slow, voltage versus loss of
synchronism, local versus wide area. . . ) and local-
ization of the collapse;
– the initiating disturbances and main stages of the
collapse (e.g. line fault, followed by overload trip-
ping, followed by voltage collapse. . . );
– the effect of protections and special control systems.
Summary of results. The above analysis resulted in a
systematic study of the weak points of the study region.
33 patterns of collapse severity were identified, and 44
dangerous disturbance patterns.
Among the 1500 simulation scenarios, 700 were found
to be stable, and the remaining 800 were divided in the
following 5 main families
 local voltage collapse;
 regional voltage collapse;
 regional voltage collapse combined with local loss of
synchronism;
 wide area voltage collapse combined with area mode
loss of synchronism;
 local loss of synchronism.
The detailed analysis of the various collapse patterns
allowed us to identify a certain number of reflex rules
which could help operators to react in the appropriate
way when a collapse starts to develop. This is indeed
possible, due to the fact that among the dynamic patterns
many start with a cascade of overloaded line trippings fi-
nally leading to the loss of a large area. This often leaves
enough time for an operator to activate an already pre-
pared load-shedding action which could relieve the over-
loads quickly enough to avoid the cascading trippings of
lines and/or generators.
On the other hand, the database was also used in or-
der to develop anticipative criteria to predict voltage col-
lapse (see e.g. [10], and Fig. 3) in order to improve auto-
matic tap-changer blocking schemes already in place on
the system.
Practical outcomes. Let us briefly enumerate various
practical possibilities which are offered by the presented
methodology.
 Assessment of the efficiency of existing protection de-
vices and defense plans (finding out how many adverse
circumstances have to occur simultaneously to reach a
large collapse).
 Improved understanding of possible interactions of
the existing protection devices (are they helping each
other, or rather fighting against each other) [14].
 Identification of the structural weaknesses of the sys-
tem (which aspects of the existing defense plan should
be improved in the future).
 Reflex rules for operators (a catalog of “situation / ac-
tion” pairs which would help operators to recognize a
dangerous situation and indicate them possible actions
to avoid worse).
 Database of very stressed simulation scenarios of var-
ious kinds, which can be used in order to evaluate de-
sign options to improve the protection/defense plan.
 Study methodology which can be used again in the fu-
ture to study other systems or monitor the safety level
of the power system.
5.2.6 Related work
In the context of emergency control, automatic learning
based approaches have been applied by various research
teams, and in particular in the context of out-of-step re-
laying. We mention the work [36] and [22, 23, 20, 33].
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper we have tried to provide a global view of
the role of emergency control in modern power systems
and various strategies to solve it. In particular, we have
discussed two complementary research directions based
respectively on system theory approaches and on auto-
matic learning.
We believe that emergency control will become more
and more important in the future. On the other hand,
we are convinced that emergency control, and more gen-
erally security control, should take into account the un-
certain and probabilistic nature of large scale power sys-
tems. Indeed, emergency control is supposed to opperate
in very unusual situations which are not well understood
and modeled in many cases, and it is supposed to handle
the very unpredictible events which may endanger the op-
eration of a power system.
Probabilistic methods allow one to build and use quan-
titative models of what we know and what we ignore
about the power system and its environment. They al-
low one also in principle to identify the real risks by
combining severities of consequences with probabilities
of causes. We are convinced that probabilistic methods,
if properly combined with system theory based simula-
tion tools, can provide in the long term more objective
and broadly accepted principles to arbitrate among pre-
ventive, emergency and restorative control options, and
in each case to identify the control actions which would
be the most effective in reducing the overall cost.
The combination of probabilistic models and system
theory based methods may be achieved in the automatic
learning based framework described in the last part of this
paper. Its practical feasibility relies on the exploitation
of many of the technological opportunities which have
been described in earlier sections: parallel computations,
database and data mining technology, and in the end in-
formation theory. It takes largely advantage of recent
progress in the system theory based approaches such as
those which have been mentioned in this paper.
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